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Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW -

DEPORTATION HEARINGS -

ATTORNEY

GENERAL REQUIRED TO MAKE DETERMINATION OF ALIEN'S ELIGIBILITY FOR ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS PRIOR TO EXERCISING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION.

Bagamasbad v. Immigration & Naturalization Service (1975)
Petitioner Bagamasbad was ordered to show cause' why she should
not be deported when she failed to effect voluntary departure as ordered,
having overstayed her nonimmigrant visa. 2 At her subsequent deportation
hearing, petitioner conceded her deportability, 3 and applied for adjustment
of her status to that of a permanent resident. 4 Without determining peti1. Deportation proceedings are commenced by the service of an order to show
cause issuing from an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) district office.
This order contains the time and place for the deportation hearing, and a concise
statement of the conduct alleged to be in violation of the law. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a),
(b) (1975).
2. Bagamasbad v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. 74-1440 (3d Cir.,
June 9, 1975). Petitioner was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant
visitor for pleasure, a term denoting that she had no intention of abandoning her
residence abroad and that she was visiting the United States temporarily for pleasure.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a) (15) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (B)
(1970). Upon realizing that she was in the United States beyond the expiration
date of her nonimmigrant visa, petitioner applied unsuccessfully to the district director
for adjustment of status, and her voluntary departure was ordered. No. 74-1440
3d Cir. at 2. For the statutory provisions governing adjustment of status, see note 4
infra. The denial of this application was not at issue in the present case. No.
74-1440 3d 'Cir. at 2.
3. No. 74-1440 3d Cir. at 2. Petitioner was deportable because she failed to
leave the United States within the 30-day period granted her to depart voluntarily.
She thus fell within the provisions of section 241 (a) (2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (Act), providing for the deportation of any alien who remains in
the United States in violation of the law. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2)

(1970).

4. Adjustment of status of a nonimmigrant to that of a person admitted for
permanent residence is governed by section 245 of the Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970).
Section 245 provides in relevant part:
who was . . . admitted . . . into the United States
The status of an alien ....
may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such
regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2)
the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United
States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is approved.
Id. 1255(a). It should be noted that the alien must meet each of the three eligibility
prerequisites before the Attorney General can exercise his discretion. 2 C. GORDON
& H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROcEDURE § 7.7b (rev. ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GORDON & ROSENFIELD].
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tioner's eligibility for such relief, 5 the special inquiry officer, 6 in his discretion, denied petitioner's application, 7 finding that favorable exercise
of administrative discretion was not merited because petitioner had deliberately and materially misrepresented her occupation and educational background when she had applied for her nonimmigrant visa.8 The special
inquiry officer then ordered her deported. 9 When the Board of Immigration
Appeals affirmed the deportation order,' 0 petitioner filed a petition for
review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,"
claiming that section 245 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(Act) mandated that her eligibility for adjustment of status be determined
before administrative discretion could be exercised to deny such adjustment.' 2 The Third Circuit vacated the deportation order and remanded, 3
holding that section 245(a) of the Act requires a determination of eligibility for status adjustment to be made by the Attorney General as a
prerequisite to the exercise of administrative discretion in granting or
denying such adjustment. Bagamasbad v. Immigration & Naturalization

Service, No. 74-1440 (3d Cir., June 9, 1975).
The Third Circuit rested its decision upon the parallelism between
section 245(a) of the Act, 14 governing adjustment of status, and section
244(a), 15 governing suspension of deportation.'" The Supreme Court of
5. No. 74-1440 3d Cir. at 2.
6. The responsibility for administering the immigration laws is lodged in the
Attorney General. Immigration and Nationality Act § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1970).
Since it would be impossible for the Attorney General to perform personally all
of his responsibilities, section 103 of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to
appoint subordinate officers and to delegate his responsibilities to them. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103 (1970). A special inquiry officer, or immigration judge as referred to in the
regulations, is such a subordinate officer.
7. No. 74-1440 3d Cir. at 2.
8. Id. Petitioner had listed her occupation as a merchant and had stated that
she had not earned a college degree when, in fact, she was a teacher and had
received a Bachelor of Science degree in medical technology in 1966. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see note 30 infra.
11. No. 74-1440 3d Cir. at 2. Section 106a of the Act governs the procedure
for judicial review of deportation orders. 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1970). A petition for
review may be filed either with the judicial circuit in which the administrative proceedings were conducted or with the circuit wherein the petitioner resides, not later
than 6 months from the date of a final deportation order. Id. A petition for review
generally stays the deportation of the alien pending determination of the petition by
the court. Immigration and. Nationality Act § 106a(a) (3), 8 U.S.C. § l105a (a) (3)
(1970).
12. No. 74-1440 3d Cir. at 3.
13. Judge Aldisert wrote the majority opinion. Judge Van Dusen dissented.
14. For the statutory provisions governing adjustment of status, see note 4 supra.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970). Section 244(a) of the act provides in relevant
part :
[T]he Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust
the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in
the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and(1) is deportable under any law of United States . . . ; has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven
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the United States in Jay v. Boyd' 7 had previously found that the statutory
design of section 244(a) provided "a right to a ruling on an applicant's
eligibility."18 In light of the "striking" similarity' 9 between the statutory
structure of section 244(a) and that of section 2 4 5 (a), the Third Circuit

found the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Jay to be both logical and
forceful. 20 The court posited three premises in reaching this conclusion.
First, section 245(a) expressly requires the satisfaction of three conditions, 21 one of them being that the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant
visa 22 before the Attorney General can exercise discrdtion to permit
permanent resident status. 23 Second, if the Attorney General does exercise
favorable discretion, it is clear that all three conditions must have been
satisfied. 24 Third, if the Attorney General reaches the point where he
decides, in his discretion, to deny relief, it is reasonable for the applicant
to conclude that he has met all three qualifications. 2 Otherwise, the court
years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that during
all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a
person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result
in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;
or
(2) is deportable ... ; has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than ten years immediately following the commission of an act, or the assumption of a status, constituting a ground for deportation,
and proves that during all of such period he has been and is a person of good
moral character; and is a person of whose deportation would, in the opinion of
the Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship ....
Id.
16. No. 74-1440 3d Cir. at 5-8.
17. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
18. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
19. No. 74-1440 3d Cir. at 6.
20. Id. at 7. Unsuccessful in distinguishing Jay, the Government relied upon
Silva v. Carter, 326 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 917 (1964).
In Silva, an alien's request for discretionary relief was denied as a matter of administrative discretion without any determination as to whether the alien met the
statutory prerequisite that his admission not be contrary to the national welfare, safety,
or security of the United States. 326 F.2d at 319. The Ninth Circuit found no error
in INS pretermitting the eligibility determination, because there was nothing in the
decision to indicate that discretionary relief was denied upon the ground of ineligibility; rather, discretionary relief was denied because of Silva's political activities and
his marital and extramarital relations. Id. Thus, the court held that the alien could
not possibly have been prejudiced by the lack of an express ruling as to his eligibility.
Id. at 320.
The Bagamasbad court properly distinguished Silva, because in Bagamasbad
the stated ground for denial of discretionary relief was deliberate and material misrepresentation, a ground which could also form the basis for a finding of ineligibility
for an immigrant visa. No. 74-1440 3d Cir. at 8; see Immigration and Nationality
Act § 212(a) (19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (19) (1970).
21. For the statutory provisions of section 245 (a) of the Act, see note 4 supra.
22. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2)

(1970).
23. No. 74-1440 3d Cir. at 7.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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concluded, "the exercise of unfavorable discretion would appear to be a
20
meaningless, unnecessary act."
The court's adoption of the Jay declaration upon the basis of the asserted analogy between the statutory schemes of sections 244(a) and
245 (a) falters, however, in view of the fact that section 244 of the Act
contains provisions absent from section 245, which provide additional
reinforcement to Jay's statement that an applicant has a right to an
eligibility determination. Subsection (c) (1) of section 24427 emphasizes
that in the context of applications for suspension of deportation, a finding
of eligibility is separate from, and must precede, the exercise of discretion,
thus supporting the statement in Jay that an eligibility determination
is the first step in the procedure for discretionary relief.28 If subsection
(c) (1) supports the proposition that an initial determination of eligibility
is implicitly required by section 244, then arguably, the lack of a similar
provision in section 245 may impel the conclusion that an eligibility determination was not meant to be statutorily required by that section.
The primary effect of the Bagamasbad decision is to impose a judicial
mandate upon a procedure voluntarily followed long before Bagamasbad
was decided, since special inquiry officers have ruled upon eligibility as a
matter of course before exercising their discretion.29 While Bagarnasbad
26. Id.

27. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (1970). Section 244 (c)(1) of the Act provides in
relevant part:
Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to meet the
requirements of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney General may in his
discretion suspend deportation of such alien.
Id. (emphasis added).
28. 351 U.S. at 352.
29. A denial of discretionary relief upon grounds of ineligibility was generally
accompanied by a statement to that effect. Similarly, if the alien were found eligible
but discretion was exercised unfavorably against him, the decision usually reported
such a finding of eligibility. These practices were ordinarily followed irrespective of
the nature of the discretionary relief sought (ultimate determination of eligibility
indicated in parentheses) ; Suspension of Deportation:Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217 (1963) (ineligible); United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v.
Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957) (eligible); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956)
(eligible); MacKay v. McAlexander, 268 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 961 (1960) (eligible) ; Pagano v. Brownell, 227 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
(ineligible) ; Adjustment of State; Carbonell v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
460 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972) (ineligible); Jarecha v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 417 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1969) (eligible); Dong Yup Lee v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 407 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1969) (ineligible) ; Diric v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 400 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015 (1969)
(ineligible) ; Ambra v. Ahren, 325 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1963) (ineligible) ; Voluntary
Departure: Stranszalis v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 465 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir.
1972) (eligible) ; Cortez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 395 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.
1968) (ineligible) ; Khalaf v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 361 F.2d 208 (7th
Cir. 1966) (ineligible) ; Bufalino v. Holland, 277 F.2d 270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 863 (1960) (ineligible) ; Giamo v. Pederson, 193 F. Supp. 527 (D.C. Ohio
1960) (ineligible); Registry of Lawful Entry: Kwai Chiu Yuen v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 406 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969)
(ineligible) ; Cortez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 395 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.
1968) (ineligible) ; Wing Wang Lee v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375
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will assure uniform adherence to this practice, the case has added significance in view of the potential harm that might have resulted to aliens had
this case been decided differently.
Where discretionary relief is denied, as in Bagamnasbad, an eligibility
determination may be independently valuable to an alien for two separate
reasons, even if deportation is inevitable. First, a finding that an alien is
ineligible for consideration for discretionary relief - status adjustment
in this case - entitles the alien to obtain administrative and judicial review.80 Since judicial review"' is permitted solely upon the administrative
record,8 2 should the record fail to include a ruling upon an alien's eligibility, the alien would be deprived of judicial review upon that issue.
Second, even if discretion is exercised unfavorably with respect to an
alien and he is deported, a determination that he was eligible for discretionary relief can be helpful to him in the event he wishes lawfully to
reenter the United States. Since a finding of eligibility for adjustment of
status by the Attorney General rests, in part, upon a preliminary determination of eligibility to receive an immigrant visa,88 the alien who applies to

F.2d 723 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 856 (1967)

(ineligible); De Lucia v.

Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 370 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 912 (1967) (ineligible) ; Scozzari v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 592 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962) (ineligible).
30. Administrative review by the Board of Immigration Appeals is permitted
under 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1975). The appeal must be taken within 10 days of the
decision of the special inquiry officer. The decision of the Board is final except in
those cases reviewed by the Attorney General pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1975).
Judicial review is provided for in section 106a of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1970).
For a summary of judicial review precedures, see note 11 supra.
31. Circuit Judge Van Dusen, dissenting in Bagamasbad, argued that since
judicial review of administrative discretionary action is limited to determinations of
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, where there has been no abuse,
judicial review should end. No. 74-1440 3d Cir. at 12 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
However, it would seem that Judge Van Dusen neglected to note the difference
between two separate procedural steps: the determination of eligibility and the
exercise of discretion. See GORDON & RosENrIELD, supra note 4, § 7.1b(3). As stated
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the context of suspension of deportation:
Since a special inquiry officer cannot exercise his discretion to suspend deportation until he finds the alien statutorily eligible for suspension, a finding of
eligibility and an exercise of (or refusal to exercise) discretion may properly be
considered as distinct and separate matters.
Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217, 228-29 n.15 (1963). Once
the issue of the right to an eligibility determination has been decided in the affirmative, as in Bagamasbad, the applicant has a right to a full and fair hearing upon the
statutory prerequisites, and this hearing is subject to review. See GORDON & ROsENFIELD, supra note 4, § 7.lb(5). This is a separate matter from the exercise of administrative discretion and the scope of its review. Id. See also Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S.
345, 352 (1956). For a discussion of review of deportation orders, see GORDON &
ROSENFIELD, supra note 4, § 8.12. For a discussion of the review of discretionary
action, see id. § 8.14.
32. Immigration and Nationality Act § 106a(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § l105a(a) (4)
(1970). The one exception to this rule concerns claims of nationality, but it is of no
consequence in this case. See id.
33. For the statutory provisions of section 245(a), see note 4 supra.
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the consular office for an immigrant visa after deportation 34 is in an advantageous position to obtain the immigrant visa if he is armed with the
persuasive authority of the Attorney General's positive determination of
eligibility. 35 This advantage is critical in view of the fact that determinations
of ineligibility made by consular officers pursuant to visa applications are
not subject to judicial review,3 6 in contrast to such determinations made
37
in connection with applications for discretionary relief.
Adjustment of status is only one of several types of discretionary
relief available under the Act for which an alien, faced with the threat of
deportation, may apply in order to avert expulsion.33 Bagamasbad's significance increases in light of the fact that the court's rationale could support the application of its holding to all such forms of discretionary
relief.3 9 First, the analogy which the Bagamasbad court drew between
sections 244(a) and 245(a) in order to justify the requirement of an
eligibility determination in the latter section is equally applicable to the
41
40
provisions governing registry of lawful entry, voluntary departure,
and waiver, 42 all of which share a statutory structure similar to that of
34. Section 221 of the Act prescribes the procedures to be followed by a
consular officer in issuing visas. 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970). To obtain an immigrant
visa, an application must be presented to an American consul stationed in the foreign
country. Id.
35. Although persuasive, the Attorney General's finding is not binding, because
section 104(a) of the Act confers upon consular officers exclusive authority to
process applications for immigrant visas. 8 U.S.C. § l104(a) (1970).
36. Only the Department of State has the power of review over refusals of
immigrant visas by consular officers, and even this power is limited to advisory
opinions which are binding only as to interpretations of law, as opposed to applications
of the law to the facts of a case. 22 C.F.R. § 42.130(c) (1975).
37. See note 30 supra.
38. In addition to adjustment of status and suspension of deportation, an alien
may seek other forms of discretionary relief, including registry of lawful entry
under section 249 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1970) ; and voluntary departure under
section 244(e) of the Act if granted during deportation proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e)
(1970), and section 242(b) and (g) of the Act if granted before commencement of
deportation proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), (g) (1970). Additional procedures
are authorized in specified situations for waiver of immigration irregularities. For
a discussion of those procedures, see GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 4, § 7.11.
39. Stay of deportation for persecution, governed by section 243(h) of the
Act, is an exception. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970). Section 243 (h) provides in relevant
part:

The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within
the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be
subject to persecution ....
Id. It is the Board of Immigration Appeals' position that a decision rejecting a
persecution claim does not have to be premised upon a determination of eligibility,
but can rest merely upon an exercise of discretion. In re Liao, 11 AD. DEcs. UNDER
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS 113 (1965). The Board took the stance that
section 243(h)'s permissive language did not support the position which maintains
that a determination of eligibility is statutorily required. Id. at 119.
40. Immigration and Nationality Act § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1970).
41. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b), (g), 244(e), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b),
(g), 1254(e) (1970).
42. For a discussion of the numerous waiver provisions, see
FIELD, supra note 4, § 7.11.
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section 244(a).43 Second, as the Bagamasbad court stressed, the conclusion
that an eligibility determination is statutorily required under section 245 (a)
was compelled not only by the analogy to section 244(a), but also by the
logic which inheres in the requirement of an eligibility determination prior to
44
the exercise of discretion.
Insofar as the interpretation of section 245 (a) is concerned, Bagamasbad's holding is supported both by precedent and logic. In as much as it
was the policy of alleviating hardship to aliens which provided the stimulus
for creating avenues of discretionary relief, 45 Bagamasbad should prescribe the procedure to be followed in applications by aliens for other
types of discretionary relief as well.
Sheryl Reeve Kohlhoff

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW -

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
HAVE RIGHT

To

TRIAL DE

UNFAVORABLE DECISION

By

Novo

IN

FEDERAL COURT FOLLOWING

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.

Sperling v. United States (1975)
Petitioner Sperling, a career federal employee,' filed a series of complaints with his employing agency, the Department of the Army,2 claiming
43. The provisions of the Act governing registry, voluntary departure, and waiver
are similar to sections 244(a) and 245(a) of the Act insofar as they provide relief
through the exercise of discretion by the Attorney General in the cases of deportable
aliens who meet certain enumerated standards. Compare, e.g., Immigration and
Nationality Act § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1970), with Immigration and Nationality Act

§ 245a, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1970).

44. No. 74-1440 3d Cir. at 7.
45. See GORDON &ROSENFIELD, supra note 4, § 7.1.
1. Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed,
44 U.S.L.W. 3138 (U.S. Aug. 15, 1975) (No. 75-247). Petitioner was employed in a
civilian capacity at the United States Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth,
New Jersey. 515 F.2d at 467.
2. 515 F.2d at 468. Regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) for processing discrimination complaints are set forth in 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.211.283 (1975). They provide that an employee who believes that he has been discriminated against may file a complaint with his employing agency, which shall investigate
the allegations in the complaint and, if the employee is unsatisfied with the results of
the investigation, shall conduct a hearing on the allegations. Id. at 713.214-.217.
This hearing is held before a complaints examiner, who must be from another agency.
Id. at 713.218. The complaints examiner reports to the head of the employing agency,
who makes the final decision with respect to the complaint. Id. at 713.218 & .221.
If the employee is dissatisfied with the agency's decision, he may appeal to the Board
of Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission. Id. at 713.231-.236.
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discrimination 3 by the Government in the granting of a promotion in
violation of section 717 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 (Act) .4 All of these complaints were resolved against him, and
petitioner's appeal to the United States Civil Service Commission's Board
of Appeals and Review was also adversely decided. 5 He then instituted
6
suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
7
Petitioner countered the Government's motion for summary judgment
with his own similar motion," claiming in the alternative that he was
entitled to trial de novo in the district court pursuant to sections 717(c) 9
and (d) 1 of the Act. The district court granted the Government's motion
for summary judgment, noting that even if petitioner's suit were cognizable under section 717(c), 11 the scope of judicial review would be limited
to a determination of whether petitioner had been accorded administrative
due process by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). 1 2 The district court
concluded that this standard had been met.13 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, 1 4 holding that section 717 of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 granted a federal employee
the right to a trial de novo in the district court, even though the Civil
3. 515 F.2d at 467. Petitioner, a white man, alleged that he was denied a promotion to a GS-13 employment level as a result of his representation of a black
employee, as a union grievance delegate in a series of discrimination hearings. Id.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
5. 515 F.2d at 468.
6. Sperling v. United States, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 223 (D.N.J. 1974). Petitioner
requested back pay, a retroactive promotion to federal employment level GS-13, and
all other rights and benefits of that position from December, 1968. 515 F.2d at 468.
7. 515 F.2d at 468. The Government contended that the decision of the Board
of Appeals of the CSC should be final, or alternatively, that review should be limited
to either a determination that administrative due process had been afforded or that
substantial evidence on the record supported the agency's finding. Id.
8. Id.
9. Section 717(c) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Act)
provides in pertinent part:
Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a department,
agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a) of this section, or by the Civil Service
Commission upon an appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency,
or unit on a complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or
national origin, . . . an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved
by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on
his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title,
in which civil action the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate,
shall be the defendant.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. IV, 1974) (emphasis added).
10. Id. § 2000e-16(d). For the text of section 717(d), see note 32 infra.
11. 8 F.E.P. Cas. at 224. The district court held that it had jurisdiction over the
petitioner's claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1970), and that
the scope of review under that Act mandated a determination of whether substantial
evidence upon the record supported the findings of the CSC. 8 F.E.P. Cas. at 224.
In the alternative, the district court found that if the suit were cognizable under
section 717, the scope of review would be even more limited. Id.
12. 8 F.E.P. Cas. at 224.
13. Id.
14. Judge Gibbons wrote the court's opinion, in which Judges Hunter and Van
Dusen joined.
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Service Commission had already adjudicated the operative facts of the
employer's claim. 15 Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir.
1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3138 (U.S. Aug. 15, 1975)
(No. 75-247).
Under Title VII, the courts have accorded private litigants the right
to a trial de novo' 6 in federal court following an unfavorable determination
of their claim by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).17 Courts have split, however, on the issue of whether a similar
15. The court also held that section 717 applies retroactively to cases where an
administrative claim was pending at the time of the statute's enactment in 1972. 515
F.2d at 474; accord, Brown v. General Servs. Adm'n, 507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987 (1975) (No. 74-768) ; Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267
(D.C. Cir. 1974) ; Koger v. Ball, 497 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1974).
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has held that the 1972 Act constituted a waiver
of sovereign immunity which should be narrowly construed, thus denying retroactive
application of section 717. Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1040 (1974). The United States Solicitor General has subsequently confessed
error upon this issue in his Memorandum in Response to a Petition for Rehearing,
Place v. Weinberger, supra. The memorandum is reprinted in 2 CCH EMPLOY.
PRACT. GUIDE
5329 (May, 1975). The Government adopted the reasoning advanced
by the Second and Fourth Circuits, concluding:
Section 717 does apply to claims of federal employment discrimination occurring
prior to March 24, 1972, if the employee's complaint was the subject of administrative proceedings on that date or if a judicial proceeding had been timely commenced after final administrative action and was pending on the Act's effective date.
Id.
16. The term "trial de novo" refers to a retrial in an appellate court, where the
case is conducted as if there had been no trial in the court below. Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 534 (D.N.J. 1971). In the instant case,
since the record of the prior administrative proceeding would be admissible as evidence
(see notes 61-68 and accompanying text infra), the use of the phrase "trial de novo"
may not be technically correct, even though the court would make a de novo determination of the facts. See generally K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§
29.01-.09 (Supp. 1970).
17. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1972) ; Beverly v. Lone Star Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971);
Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970).
Although private individuals have always had a right of action under Title
VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave no enforcement powers to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), limiting the EEOC to informal methods of
conference, conciliation and persuasion. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (1970), as amended (Supp. IV, 1974). These methods often proved ineffective against employers whose discriminatory practices were not a result of malicious
intent, but rather were products of institutional defects in hiring and promotional
procedures. Although the Justice Department was given the power to prosecute where
there was a pattern or practice of discrimination, employment discrimination was
essentially viewed as a private wrong, with the burden of enforcing Title VII placed
upon private individuals. This vacuum in enforcement powers was identified as a
major factor in impeding the eradication of employment discrimination by both the
House and Senate committees considering revisions of Title VII. See SENATE COMMf.
ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES ENFORCEMENT
ACT of 1971, S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-8 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT]; HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES ENFORCEMENT ACT of 1971, H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5

(1971)

[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
The 1972 Act gave the EEOC the power to enforce its decisions through the
federal courts, while preserving the private right of action for public sector employees.
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right was granted to federal employees by section 717 of the Act,' 8 which
amended Title VII to prohibit discrimination in federal government employment upon the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, 19
and vested the CSC with increased powers 20 of enforcement. 21 A civil
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. IV, 1974).
Both the Senate (S. 2515) and House (H.R. 1746) versions of the revision to Title
VII were reported out of committee containing provisions vesting the EEOC with
cease and desist powers. S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ; H.R. 1746, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971). Such orders were to be reviewed in the court of appeals, presumably
upon a "substantial evidence" standard. SENATE REPORT, supra at 22-23; HousE
REPORT, supra at 10. However, in both the House and Senate, there was strong
opposition to cease and desist powers. Ultimately, such powers were replaced by
giving the EEOC power to obtain judicially enforceable court orders. 118 CONG. Rnc.
3959-79 (1972) (Senate debate on S. 2515); 117 id. 31958-85, 32058-110 (1971)
(House debate on H.R. 1746). See generally Hart & Sape, Title VII Reconsidercd:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972).
18. At the time Sperling was decided, the leading case rejecting trial de novo
for section 717 cases was Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973),
rev'd sub nom. Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Comment,
Hackley v. Johnson: The Federal Employee's Right to Trial De Novo Review of
Civil Service Discrimination Determinations, 123 U. PA. L. R~v. 206 (1974). Most
courts which have held similarly have relied upon Hackley. See, e.g., Chandler v.
Johnson, 515 F.2d 251 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Chandler v. Roudebush,
96 S. Ct. 34 (1975) (No. 74-1599); Salone v. United States, 511 F.2d 902 (10th
Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. June 19, 1975) (No.
74-1600); Guilday v. United States Dep't of Justice, 385 F. Supp. 1096 (D. Del.
1974); Thompson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 372 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal.
1974); Pointer v. Sampson, 62 F.R.D. 689 (D.D.C. 1974) ; Johnson v. United States
Postal Serv., 364 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 497 F.2d 128
(5th Cir. 1974).
However, a number of courts have held that an aggrieved federal employee
does have the right to trial de novo. See, e.g., Caro v. Schultz, 521 F.2d 1084 (7th
Cir. 1975); Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'g Hackley v.
Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973); Hunt v. Schlesinger, 389 F. Supp. 725
(W.D. Tenn. 1974); Robinson v. Klassen, 9 F.E.P. Cas. 84 (E.D. Ark. 1974);
Thompson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 360 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd on
rehearing, Thompson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 372 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal.
1974). See also McLaughlin v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. Ala. 1974) (discretionary right to trial de novo).
19. Section 717(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . .
shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
20. The definition of "employer" under Title VII, as enacted in 1964, specifically
excluded the Government. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(b), Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§ 701(b), 78 Stat. 253. A federal policy of eliminating discrimination in Government
employment practices, however, had been articulated through a series of executive
proclamations, with the CSC given the responsibility for overseeing the Government's
equal employment opportunity efforts. Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1969),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965).
'Both the House and Senate found that the system of enforcement of fair
employment rights set forth in the executive proclamations had been ineffective and
sought to bring federal employees within the mandate of Title VII. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 17, at 12-17; HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 22-26. The report of the
House committee was especially critical of the CSC's performance, with the result
that the House version of the revision of Title VII transferred the enforcement of
anti-discrimination policies in the Government to the EEOC. Id. The report noted
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remedy in the district courts, either before or after appeal to the CSC,
was provided to aggrieved federal employees by section 717(c).22 However, the interrelationship between that remedy and other sections of
Title VII, coupled with the difficulty in ascertaining legislative intent,
raised a question regarding the scope of the civil remedy afforded by
23
section 717(c).
Courts which have considered the question of the scope of judicial
review to be exercised on an aggrieved federal employee's appeal have
looked to both the legislative history and the statutory language for
guidance. 24 In Hackley v. Johnson,25 the leading case at the time of the
Sperling decision, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia concluded that a trial de novo was not required in all section 717
cases:
A fair reading of the statute shows that the courts and the Commission
are to work together and complement one another's weaknesses and
strengths. . . . Viewing the Act and its history broadly, Congress
intended to guarantee access to the courts - "a civil action"
- to
28
eliminate previous barriers but not to start the process anew.
that the CSC rarely reversed agency decisions and emphasized the lack of confidence
federal employees had in the ability of the CSC to reach just resolutions in processing
complaints of employment discrimination. Id. at 24. Furthermore, the House committee was disturbed by the conflict of interest inherent in permitting the CSC to
judge its own practices and procedures. Id. The Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare was equally critical of the CSC's progress in eliminating discrimination
in the federal government. Nevertheless, the Senate version of the bill retained
enforcement power in the CSC. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 17, at 12-17. The Senate
report recognized the potential conflict of interest in CSC enforcement, but was
convinced of the CSC's sincere desire to eradicate employment discrimination. Id.
The Senate version of section 717 was ultimately enacted by Congress. 515 F.2d at 480.
21. Section 717(b) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the Civil Service Commission
shall have authority to enforce the provisions of subsection (a) of this section
through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with
or without pay, as will effectuate the policies of this section, and shall issue such
rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate
to carry out its responsibilities under this section.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
22. Id. § 2000e-16(c). For the text of section 717(c), see note 9 supra.
23. 515 F.2d at 469.
24. See note 18 supra.
25. 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973). This decision by Judge Gesell was
accorded great deference by other courts, due, no doubt, to the frequency of federal
employment litigation in the District of Columbia Circuit. See 515 F.2d at 474 n.39.
Subsequent to the Sperling decision, Hackley was reversed on appeal. Hackley v.
Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
26. 360 F. Supp. at 1251. In so concluding, the court considered such factors as
the traditional judicial treatment accorded CSC determinations (see note 45 and
accompanying text infra) and the additional powers given to the CSC by section 717.
360 F. Supp. at 1250-52; see note 21 supra. Weight was also given to the remarks
made upon the Senate floor by Senator Williams, a principal sponsor of the bill and
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, during which he
stated that only a right to review of the administrative record, rather than a trial
de novo, was to be afforded federal employees. Id. at 1252, citing 118 CONG. REc.
4922 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams). But see note 42 infra.
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Hackley required no new trial if, upon careful examination of the CSC
record, the district court determined that "an absence of discrimination
' 27
[was] established by the clear weight of the evidence in the record.
Prior to Sperling, other courts which had held that a right to trial de novo
exists had relied primarily upon the statute's language without fully
28
considering the possible impact of its legislative history.

The Sperling court, after determining that section 717 was entitled
to retroactive application, 29 considered the proper scope of judicial review
to be exercised by the federal courts in section 717 cases, finding justification
for de novo review both in its statutory language 0 and its legislative
history.31 The court noted that the language of section 706, which section 717(d) incorporates by reference, 32 indicated that the district courts
are to make an independent factual determination as to an employment
discrimination charge.33 Therefore, the court concluded that if any limitation upon the scope of judicial review exists in the Act's provisions, it must
be found in the language of section 717.34 The Third Circuit found no
such limitation in section 717(d), however, and noted that in some section
717 cases, the trial must be de novo, since there would be no agency
record upon which to base a more limited review.3 5
Other courts had contended that since section 717(d) states that
section 706 governs civil actions only "as applicable,"3 6 there might be
situations in which trial de novo is not availableY' Sperling rejected this
contention, concluding that section 706(f) through (k) contained no lan27. 360 F. Supp. at 1252.
28. See note 18 supra. Subsequent to the decision in Sperling, other courts have
relied upon the legislative history of section 717 to uphold the right to trial de novo.
See, e.g., Caro v. Schultz, 521 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1975) ; Hackley v. Roudebush, 520
F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
29. 515 F.2d at 473; see note 15 supra.
30. 515 F.2d at 474-77.
31, Id.
32. Section 717(d) provides: "The provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k)
of this title, as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16(d) (Supp. IV, 1974) (emphasis added).
Section 706(f) (4) provides in part: "It shall be the duty of the chief judge
of the district ... to designate a judge in such district to hear and determine the case."
Id. § 2000e-5(f) (emphasis added). Sperling cited this language as clearly requiring
a de novo determination at the district court level. 515 F.2d at 475.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. IV, 1974) ; see note 32 supra.
34. 515 F.2d at 475.
35. Id. According to section 717(c), if a complaint of employment discrimination
is filed by a federal employee with his employing agency, and the agency does not
make a final disposition upon that claim within 180 days, the employee has the right
to file suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). Such a suit
would, of necessity, require a trial de novo, since there would be no agency record
to review.
36. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
37. This line of reasoning was suggested in Hackley. 360 F. Supp. at 1252 n.9. It
was more fully developed in Guilday v. United States Dep't of Justice, 385 F. Supp.
1096 (D. Del. 1974), where the court construed the words "as applicable" to permit
judicial discretion regarding the scope of judicial review. Id. at 1097-99.
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guage which could be read to exclude trial de novo in any case.38 Finally,
the court argued that a reading of the statute which would preclude de novo
review would constitute little advance in the law prior to 1972 in jurisdictions, such as the Third Circuit, which had already permitted judicial
review of federal employment discrimination cases.3 9
The court then examined the legislative history, interpreting it as also
manifesting an intent to provide de novo review for federal employees.
First, the court noted the criticism of the CSC's performance in both the
House and Senate reports, 40 ultimately giving the Senate committee report
great weight, since the Senate version of section 717 was adopted as the final
version. 4 1 The Senate report expressly stated that federal employees
were to be granted the same rights that individuals in the private sector
were given under Title VII.42 Second, the court observed that, since the
38. 515 F.2d at 476; see note 32 supra. The court also observed an inconsistency
in the reasoning of courts which had claimed jurisdiction under section 706(f) (3),
while contemporaneously asserting that sections (f) through (k) were inapposite
for trial de novo purposes. 515 F.2d at 476.
39. 515 F.2d at 477. Prior to 1972, some circuit courts had refused to review
CSC decisions in employment discrimination cases due to sovereign immunity. See,
e.g., Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969) (sovereign immunity
a bar to private right of action for money damages pursuant to Executive Order
11,246). In jurisdictions where sovereign immunity was a bar to such claims, it
could be argued that the Act operated as a waiver. 515 F.2d 477 n.48. However, this
argument would not apply in the Third Circuit since that circuit never recognized
sovereign immunity as a bar to federal employment discrimination claims. See
Iannarelli v. Morton, 463 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972); Rosenman v. Levbarg, 435 F.2d
1286 (3d Cir. 1970); DeLong v. Hampton, 422 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1970); Charlton v.
United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969). For a discussion of the relationship
between sovereign immunity and the issue of retroactivity, see note 15 supra.
40. 515 F.2d at 470-71; see note 20 and accompanying text supra.
41. 515 F.2d at 480.
42. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 16. The relevant section of the Senate
report relied upon in Sperling states in part:
An important adjunct to the strengthened Civil Service Commission responsibilities is the statutory provision of a right of action in the courts by Federal
employees who are not satisfied with the agency or Commission decision.
• .. The provisions adopted by the committee will enable the Commission
to grant full relief to aggrieved employees, or applicants, including back pay and
immediate advancement as appropriate. Aggrieved employees or applicants will
also have the full rights available in the courts as are granted to individuals in
the private sector under Title VII.
Id. (emphasis added).
The clear import of this section was that de novo review was granted by
section 717. This conclusion, however, was contradicted by remarks made on the
Senate floor by Senator Williams, a principal sponsor of S. 2515, in which he stated:
Finally, written expressly into the law is a provision enabling an aggrieved
federal employee to file an action in U.S. District Court for a review of the
administrative proceeding record after a final order by his agency or by the
Civil Service Commission, if he is dissatisfied with that decision.
118 CONG. Rc. 4922 (1972)
(remarks of Senator Williams) (emphasis added).
After comparing Senator William's analysis of section 717 with the Senate
committee report, the Sperling court concluded that since the Senate report represented "the consensus of the committee charged with studying the bill, it more
accurately reflect[ed] the congressional intent." 515 F.2d at 480.
It has been suggested that the discrepancy between the statement made by
Senator Williams and the Senate report is attributable to the fact that the bill as
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words "as applicable" were inserted in the Senate bill prior to the provision of a role for the CSC in Title VII litigation, there was little justification
for construing those words as a limitation upon section 717 when no such
limitation had been imported into discrimination litigation involving private
43
parties.
In addition to these factors, policy considerations may also shed light
upon the probable interpretation of the legislative history. While the court
did not expressly rest its conclusion upon such considerations, they were
4
acknowledged by the court and did influence its decision.
One such consideration is the autonomy which has been traditionally
granted to the CSC with respect to its employment decisions in nondiscrimination cases, 45 and the courts' resulting reluctance to interfere with
46
the CSC's special procedures for dealing with federal personnel disputes.
Congress' grant of enforcement powers to the CSC greater than those
granted to the EEOC47 may indicate that the remedies available to federal
originally contemplated by committee would have given the EEOC cease and desist
power, with limited review in the court of appeals upon a "substantial evidence"
standard. See note 17 supra. See also Pointer v. Sampson, 62 F.R.D. 689 (D.D.C.
1974). Thus, it is reasoned, CSC final determinations would have been reviewed
according to a similar standard. Id. at 693. This analysis, however, ignores the fact
that the Senate committee version of the bill expressly preserved the private right
of action in federal court as a concurrent remedy to cease and desist orders. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 17, at 23. In the Senate committee's version of section 717, the
provision governing private civil actions refers to subsections (q) through (w)
of section 706, which are concerned with the private right of action, not to the subsections governing the right of review in the court of appeals. Id. at 45.
43. 515 F.2d at 476. The version of section 717 contained in the original text of
S. 2515, when referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, provided
for the EEOC to be vested with enforcement powers. That version of the bill contained the words "as applicable" in section 717(d). 117 CONG. REc. 31735 (1971).
Subsequently, the Senate committee amended section 717 to provide for enforcement
by the CSC, rather than the EEOC. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 45.
44. 515 F.2d at 469-73.
45. Judicial review of CSC decisions in nondiscrimination cases is limited, and
in no case is trial de novo provided. However, several standards for review have been
proposed: limiting review to determining whether required procedures were complied
with, e.g., Benson v. United States, 421 F.2d 515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
943, rehearing denied, 400 U.S. 857 (1970) ; limiting review to insuring that required
procedures were complied with and that action taken was not arbitrary or capricious;
e.g., Pauley v. United States, 419 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1969) ; and limiting review to
determining whether procedural errors existed, whether action was arbitrary or
capricious, and whether "substantial evidence on the record" supported the action,
e.g., Polcover v. Secretary of the Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1001 (1974). See also Johnson & Stoll, Judicial Review of Federal
Employee Dismissals and Other Adverse Actions, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 178 (1972) ;
Merrill, Proceduresfor Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REV.

196 (1973).
46. Civil service regulations governing adverse actions are found at 5 C.F.R. §§
752.101-.402 (1975).
47. If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that an allegation of employment discrimination is true, it is limited to "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. 2000-5(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). If, however, after
30 days from the filing of the charge no conciliation agreement acceptable to the
EEOC is reached, that agency has the right to bring a civil action against the em-
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employees are not necessarily parallel to those available to private sector
employees. 48 Rather, due to the CSC's familiarity with federal employment
practices, the federal employee's right to resort to the courts may be more
limited. As suggested in Hackley, the CSC may best be qualified to distinguish between legitimate civil service qualifications for hiring and
promotion, and personnel practices which are discriminatory. 49
On the other hand, this very familiarity with federal hiring requirements may render the CSC less sensitive to the more subtle types of
discrimination possibly caused by structural defects in the CSC's own procedures. This inherent conflict of interest within the CSC, recognized by both
branches of Congress,"0 may thus make a trial de novo even more essential in
federal employment cases than in private sector litigation. The Sperling
court recognized that the "policy decision implicit in the enactment of § 717
...[is] that the executive branch agencies [should] no longer be the judges
of their own motivation." 5' 1 Thus, the concerns expressed in the legislative
history, such as the desire to provide public sector employees with the
same rights as those enjoyed by the private sector and the dissatisfaction
Congress
with the past performance of the CSC, further indicated that
52
intended to provide for de novo review of CSC determinations.
ployer. Id. § 2000-5(f) (1). Thus, the remedies for a Title VII violation in the
private sector are fashioned by the courts. See generally Hart & Sape, supra note 17,
at 862-74. The CSC, on the other hand, is empowered to enforce the provisions of
section 717(a), including, but not limited to, ordering reinstatement and back pay.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
48. Some support for this position might be found in the reasoning of several
cases decided prior to 1972 which granted a trial de novo following an EEOC finding
of "no reasonable cause." A major factor in these decisions was the unfairness that
would have resulted if an agency with no power of enforcement could have precluded
a private right of action. See, e.g., Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437
F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 425 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970).
Following this line of reasoning, a trial de novo would not be as necessary following
a CSC final determination, since much greater enforcement power was given to the
CSC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). However, it should be noted that a
private right of action was expressly retained in the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, in spite of increased enforcement powers given to the EEOC. Id.
§ 2000e-5(f) (1).
49. 360 F. Supp. at 1252.
50. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
51. 515 F.2d at 483.
52. In addition, procedural limitations in the agency hearing process, such as lack
of discovery and compulsory process, may make the agency an inappropriate forum
for final resolution of Title VII rights. See 5 C.F.R. 713.216-.221 (1974).
The Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974),
cited procedural limitations in the arbitration system as one rationale for granting a
trial de novo to employees aggrieved by an unfavorable determination of a claim of
employment discrimination. The Court buttressed its conclusion by noting such
deficiencies as the incomplete record, the nonapplication of rules of evidence, and the
unavailability of such procedures as discovery, compulsory process, and crossexamination. The Court concluded that arbitrators should not be given ultimate
responsibility for determination of Title VII rights. Id. at 57. Although similar
procedural deficiencies exist within the agency hearing process, the considerations
voiced in Alexander may not be determinative. In Alexander, the Court determined
that arbitral findings designed to effect the intent of a private contract should be

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 8
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 21

After holding that a federal employee is entitled to a trial de novo
following an adverse CSC ruling, the Third Circuit had to decide what
role, if any, the employing agency's factfinding record should play in that
proceeding. 3 The court expressly rejected the standard set by the district
court in Hackley,54 that the record establish the absence of discrimination
by the "clear weight of the evidence," 55 and the district court's view in
Guilday v. United States Department of Justice,56 that the absence of
discrimination be established by a "preponderance of the evidence." 57
Instead, the Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiff has the burden of
proving his or her claim of discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence. 58 Thus, although the agency record may be the basis upon which
a motion for summary judgment is granted, 59 the record is otherwise
simply of evidentiary value,60 the admissibility of which is governed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence.
A major question which was left unanswered by Sperling is the
weight to be given the agency record by the federal court for summary
judgment or trial purposes. A recent United States Supreme Court decision, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,61 discussed the analogous problem of
the weight to be accorded arbitral decisions upon the issue of employment
discrimination in Title VII cases. While the Court adopted no specific
standard, concluding that the weight given would be discriminatory with
exposed to full judicial review where Title VII rights are involved. Id. By contrast,
it could be argued that an agency hearing under the aegis of the CSC should be
accorded greater deference, since Congress implicitly exhibited confidence in the
CSC by vesting the power in that agency to enforce statutorily based rights arising
under Title VII. See generally Comment, Judicial Deference to Arbitrators'Decisions
in Title VII Cases, 26 STAN. L.REV. 421 (1974). For further discussion of Alexander,
see text accompanying notes 61-64 infra.

53. 515 F.2d at 482.
54. Id. at 482-83.
55. 360 F. Supp. at 1252. Hackley rejected the "substantial evidence" standard
holding that if the absence of discrimination is not established by the clear weight of
the evidence, the court may, in its discretion, remand, take supplementary testimony,
or grant relief to the plaintiff. Id. Sperling criticized this standard, finding no statutory authority for remand. 515 F.2d at 482. The Third Circuit's primary objection to
this standard, however, was that a remand to the employing agency would shield the
ultimate trier of fact from direct confrontation with crucial witnesses, and would
contravene the "policy decision" implicit in section 717 that agencies should no longer
be permitted to evaluate their own motivation. Id. at 482-83; see text accompanying
note 51 supra.
56. 385 F. Supp. 1096 (D. Del. 1974).
57. Id. at 1102. Guilday concluded that a preliminary determination of whether
the absence of discrimination has been established by the preponderance of the evidence could be made upon a motion for summary judgment. Id.
58. Although the Sperling court acknowledged the propriety of summary judgment in many cases, it also observed that this "hybrid judicial review" is not provided
for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 56, and would be difficult
for a district court, deciding the motion, to apply in cases which turned upon the issue
of credibility. 515 F.2d at 483.
59. 515 F.2d at 484.
60. Id.
61. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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the court, 62 it did set forth in a footnote several factors that a court should
consider when exercising its discretion, including the procedural fairness
in the arbitration forum and the adequacy of the record. 63 The court
concluded:
Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight.
This is especially true where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically
addressed by the parties
and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of
64
an adequate record.
Applying similar standards in section 717 cases might result in the granting of considerable weight to the administrative record, even though the
court would technically be making a de novo determination of the factual
issues before it. However, if district courts did place undue weight upon
the agency record, the benefit guaranteed by a de novo review would be
illusory. To this end, the Third Circuit in Sperling indicated that where
summary judgment is inappropriate, 65 a full de novo hearing, replete with
witnesses, should be held due to the potential problems of allowing the
employing agency to make the final factual determination.66 This, in turn,
may indicate that the agency record is to be given no more weight than,
for example, prior testimony taken at a deposition.67 This would not preclude, however, admitting the agency record in lieu of live testimony, in
cases where counsel agree that live testimony would be redundant.68
The Sperling decision has enunciated a logical rationale for requiring
a trial de novo of federal employment discrimination cases in federal
court. Permitting de novo review will ensure that class actions brought
62. Id. at 60.
63. Id. n.21. The Supreme Court stated:
Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural
fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue
of discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators.
Id.; see note 52 supra.
64. 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. In Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that similar treatment should be accorded
the agency record in a section 717 action. Id. at 156-57.
65. The Sperling court recognized that the agency record may justify granting a
motion for summary judgment where "there is no genuine fact issue as to the absence
of discrimination." 515 F.2d at 482.
66. Id. at 483.
67. For cases discussing the treatment given by courts to EEOC reports in Title
VII suits involving private sector litigants, see Turner v. Drug Fair Community Drug
Co., 5 CCH EMPLOY. PRACT. DEC. 8653 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Smith v.
Universal Servs., Inc., 454 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd. Co.,
52 F.R.D. 383 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973).
68. The District of Columbia Circuit anticipated this situation in Hackley v.
Roudebush, 520 F.2d at 157-59. The court noted that "rendering the record admissible
may obviate the necessity for taking extensive testimony at trial," id. at 157, but
added, "[m]erely because an individual testified at the agency level does not mean
that he would not be required to testify at the trial in the District Court. The
decision . . . remains with counsel." Id. at 158-59.
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by federal employees under Title VII will not be precluded by restrictive
standards of review. Under a more limited scope of review, class actions
had been prevented due to the absence of a record for all class members. 69
Expanded review will also ensure that federal employees' Title VII rights
will be ultimately protected by the federal courts, as are the rights of
private sector employees. Although it has been argued that permitting de
70
novo review would significantly increase the federal court docket, especially in districts where there are large numbers of federal employees, the
Sperling court noted that such concerns are "properly within the sphere
71
of the legislature.
Julia A. Conover

FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
TION -

-

SECTION

4244

EXAMINA-

COURT-APPOINTED PSYCHIATRIST WHO CONDUCTS EXAMINA-

TION OF DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL PURSUANT TO
SECTION 4244 ORDER CANNOT TESTIFY AT TRIAL CONCERNING
DEFENDANT'S SANITY AT TIME OF OFFENSE.

EVIDENCE

-

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE -

PSYCHIATRIST RETAINED

BY DEFENSE COUNSEL IN PREPARATION FOR TRIAL BUT NOT USED
AS A WITNESS CANNOT BE CALLED TO TESTIFY BY THE GOVERNMENT.

United States v. Alvarez (1975)

(J. Martinez, appellant)

Prior to the defendant's trial for kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap,
he raised the issue of his competency to stand trial.' Complying with an
order of the court issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244,2 the defendant
69. See, e.g., Pointer v. Sampson, 62 F.R.D. 689 (D.D.C. 1974).
70. But see Comment, supra note 18. One commentator has suggested that in the
absence of de novo review, more federal employees, due to lack of confidence in CSC
review, will exercise their right under sction 717(c) to bypass the CSC and file suit
directly in federal court. See note 20 supra. Thus, although the appellate burden of
the federal courts may be reduced, more cases may be initially filed there. However,
courts which have held that there is no de novo review upon appeal from the CSC
may hold similarly with regard to direct appeals to the federal courts following an
unfavorable determination by the employing agency. See, e.g., Thompson v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 372 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
71. 515 F.2d at 484.
1. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1039 (3d Cir. 1975) (J. Martinez,
appellant).
2. Id. Section 4244 provides in pertinent part:
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to
the expiration of any period of probation the United States Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a person charged with an offense against the United
States may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be
unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his
own defense, he shall file a motion for a judicial determination of such mental
competency of the accused, setting forth the ground for such belief with the
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submitted to a psychiatric examination by Dr. Flicker, a court-appointed
psychiatrist and subsequently was found competent to stand trial. 3 At
trial, the defendant raised the defense of insanity. 4 To overcome that
defense, the Government called three psychiatrists as witnesses, two of
whom, Dr. Flicker and Dr. Sadoff, testified over defendant's objections. 5
Dr. Flicker's testimony was allegedly objectionable because his knowledge
of the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense had been gathered
pursuant to § 4244.6 With regard to Dr. Sadoff, the defense argued that
his testimony violated the attorney-client privilege and defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel since he had originally been retained by the
defendant's counsel 7 to examine the defendant concerning the defendant's
sanity at the time of the kidnapping. 8 Overruling defendant's objection the
trial court in which the proceedings are pending. Upon such a motion or upon
a similar motion in behalf of the accused, or upon its own motion, the court
shall cause the accused whether or not previously admitted to bail, to be examined
as to his mental condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report
to the court. . . . If the report of the psychiatrist indicates a state of present
insanity or such mental incompetency in the accused, the court shall hold a
hearing, upon due notice, at which evidence as to the mental condition of the
accused may be submitted, including that of the reporting psychiatrist, and make
a finding with respect thereto. No statement made by the accused in the course
of any examination into his sanity or mental competency provided for by this
section, whether the examination shall be with or without the consent of the
accused, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt
in any criminal proceeding. A finding by the judge that the accused is mentally
competent to stand trial shall in no way prejudice the accused in a plea of insanity as a defense to the crime charged; such finding shall not be introduced
in evidence on that issue nor otherwise be brought to the notice of the jury.
18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
3. 519 F2d at 1039.
4. Id. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey bifurcated the trial, trying the issue of participation in the crime separately from the
insanity issue. Only after the jury had found Martinez to be a participant in the
kidnapping was the issue of his sanity when committing. the crime tried. Id.
'The test for insanity in the Third Circuit was defined in United States v.
Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). The court stated:
The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the prohibited act
the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to
have violated.
Id. at 774 (footnote omitted).
5. 519 F.2d at 1041, 1045. Martinez introduced testimony by his sister and
by a psychiatrist, Dr. Charles L. Trent. The latter's testimony established, prima
facie, that Martinez was insane at the time of the offense. Id. at 1039.
6. Id. at 1040.
7. Id. at 1045. Dr. Sadoff was retained pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1)
(1970). Section 3006A(e) (1) provides in pertinent part:
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert,
or other services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an
ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte
proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is financially
unable to obtain them, the court . . . shall authorize counsel to obtain the
services.

8. 519 F.2d at 1045.
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court admitted the testimony 9 and the defendant was convicted. 10 Upon
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,'
holding 1) that section 4244 prohibits the admission at trial of a psychiatrist's testimony, which is based upon information obtained pursuant to a
section 4244 order, concerning defendant's sanity during the commission
of the crime; and 2) that the attorney-client privilege was violated, and
the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel obstructed, by the
admission at trial of the compelled testimony of a psychiatrist who had
been retained by defendant's counsel to aid in the preparation of the
defense. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
Federal courts have not arrived at consistent conclusions in interpreting the scope of section 4244. Some circuits have held that an
examination ordered under section 4244 can properly fulfill the dual purpose of determining the defendant's competency to stand trial and his or
her sanity at the time of the offense.' 2 Others have held that section 4244
does not authorize an order which compels a defendant to submit to a
psychiatric examination in order to determine his or her sanity at the time
of the offense, but rather that it is limited solely to orders which deter9.
10.
11.
Dusen.

Id. at 1039.
Id.
The opinion was written by Judge Gibbons who was joined by Judge Van
Judge Hunter wrote a concurring opinion.
The Alvarez court decided two other subsidiary issues. Martinez had requested the district court to instruct the jury that if he were found not guilty by
reason of insanity he could be confined to a hospital until he recovered his sanity
and was no longer considered dangerous to society. The district court refused to
give the instruction. Id. at 1048. On appeal, the Third Circuit reasoned that such
an instruction would mislead the jury with respect to a federal defendant tried
outside the District of Columbia, for only in the District of Columbia are there
statutory provisions allowing commitment of a defendant found not guilty by reason

of insanity. See 24 U.S.C. §§ 211-12 (1970) ; D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (1973).

Elsewhere, commitment procedure is within the respective state's discretion. 519
F.2d at 1048. Thus, the Third Circuit in Alvarez found the district court's refusal
both proper and in accord with the preponderance of federal authorities. Id. For
citations to such authorities, see id. at 1048 n.18.
The other issue was whether upon remand a new trial of the entire case, or
simply of the insanity question alone, should be provided. The Third Circuit recognized that civil cases are frequently remanded for retrial upon limited issues, but
in light of a complete absence of federal authority pertaining to criminal cases, and
in deference to the institution of the jury trial, the court held that when a new trial is
ordered in a criminal case in which there were bifurcated jury determinations, a
new trial of the entire case is required. Id. at 1049-51.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Julian, 469 F.2d 371, 376 (10th Cir. 1970)
Edmonds v. United States, 273 F.2d 108, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 977 (1960).
United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1974), as well as,
United States v. Moudy, 462 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972), strongly suggest that the
current position of the Fifth Circuit is to allow a dual-purpose examination under
section 4244. 488 F.2d at 410 n.3; 462 F.2d at 697.
United States v. Driscoll, 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968), may be read as
saying that section 4244 permits a dual-purpose examination to be ordered upon notice
of that fact to defendant. Id. at 137-38. Other language in Driscoll, however, suggests that the court possesses an inherent power to order an examination into defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. Id. at 139.
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mine a defendant's competency to stand trial.'8 These latter circuits, as
well as others, have held, however, that a court has the inherent power,
independent of any statutory authority, to authorize an examination into
14
the accused's sanity at the time of the offense.
While the construction and scope of section 4244 is a serious problem,
it has yet to take on constitutional dimensions. 15 The same cannot be
said of the second issue that the Alvarez court had to confront: the possible
invasion of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege 6 and violation of the
sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, created when
a psychiatrist hired by defense counsel was subpoenaed by the Government
and compelled to testify over defense counsel's objections. 17 The attorneyclient privilege was developed in order to facilitate an atmosphere in which
clients could freely consult legal advisors.' 8 The theory was that in the
absence of such a privilege, the fear that disclosures to the attorney may
later be compelled would inhibit the consultation. 19 Since the assistance
of agents is often necessary to the attorney's work, the privilege was ex20
tended to communications between the client and the attorney's agent.
In deciding whether the section 4244 order should be treated as a
single- or dual-purpose order, the court initially addressed the Government's contentions that Dr. Flicker's testimony at trial, concerning Martinez' sanity while committing the offense, was properly admitted. The
Government argued first, that the court of appeals should have deemed
13. See, e.g., United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 722-25 (4th Cir. 1968).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1973)

United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1971) ; United States v. Albright,
388 F.2d 719, 722-25 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 719-21
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,401 U.S. 949 (1971).
15. There is a potential constitutional problem, however, if section 4244 is used
to compel a defendant to be examined concerning his sanity at the time of the offense
and the prosecution is allowed to use the psychiatrist's testimony at trial. The
problem is one of self-incrimination. See note 24 and accompanying text infra.
16. See generally 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542-45 (McNaughten rev.
1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE] ; id. § 2291, at 545-54; id. § 2301, at 563.
17. Although there is no federal authority upon this subject, there are two
pertinent state cases. In City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37
Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951), the Supreme Court of California held that a physician,
hired by plaintiff's counsel not to treat plaintiff, but to examine him for neurological
and psychiatric disorder, could not invoke the physician-patient privilege, but, as an
agent for communication between plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel, could invoke the
attorney-client privilege. Id. at 234-38, 231 P.2d at 29-32.
The court in State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957), a murder
case, held that communications made by the accused to the defense-retained psychiatrist during an examination into defendant's sanity were protected by the attorneyclient privilege. Id. at 411-17, 129 A.2d at 423-26.
18. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 2291, at 545.
19. Id.
20. See id. § 2301, at 583. For example, where the attorney's law clerk or
confidential secretary sits in during a conference between the attorney and client,
the privilege remains intact. C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVmENCa
§ 91, at 188-89 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
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the district court's order 2' as one made pursuant to the court's inherent
power to order an examination into sanity at the time of the offense ;22
and secondly, that the prohibition in section 4244 against the use of
inculpatory statements precludes only admissions concerning participation
in the crime and not admissions bearing upon the sanity issue.23 The
Alvarez court dismissed the first contention, stating that whatever inherent
power a district court might possess, the instant order was clearly made
pursuant only to section 4244.24 The court then examined the legislative
history of section 4244 and determined that its express prohibition against
the use at trial of the defendant's statements made during the competency
examination applied not only to the defendant's statements regarding
participation in the crime but also to the psychiatrist's opinion formulated
as a result of the section 4244 examination. 25 Briefy, the court reasoned
21. The order provided in part:
It is this llth day of April, 1974

ORDERED

that Dr. David J. Flicker be and

hereby is appointed pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C., Section 4244, to conduct a
psychiatric examination of defendant John Martinez on April 13, 1974 ....
519 F.2d at 1040.
22. Id. at 1041.
23. The Government also contended that even if the admission of Dr. Flicker's
testimony was error, the error was harmless. Id. This contention was summarily dismissed by the court, since Flicker had been the only witness who found that Maritinez
was not suffering from a mental illness. Id. at 1045.
24. Id. at 1041. In the court's opinion, defense counsel would have objected to a
dual-purpose order. Id.
If the examination had been compelled over objection, the court would have
had to decide the fifth amendment issue of involuntary self-incrimination. Although
the Alvarez court was careful to refrain from deciding whether a court has the inherent power to compel a defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination for the
benefit of Government prosecutors, or whether a dual-purpose order is permissible
under section 4244's sanction, it strongly indicated, in dicta, that use at trial of statements which had been obtained in a court-ordered psychiatric examination and which
tended to "establish the fact of the offense or the voluntariness of other statements
by the accused" would violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. at 1042.
'The court also indicated that an examination into sanity at the time of the
offense, which is a part of the requisite mens rea of the crime, would violate the
privilege. Id. at 1042-43. In support of this proposition the court cited its recent
decision in Virgin Islands v. Bellott, 495 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1974), noted in 20 VILL.
L. REV. 604 (1975), which held that sanity was a question concerning guilt or innocence which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 495 F.2d at 1396.
See generally Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination? Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 489 (1965); Note, Requiring A
Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An
Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARV. L. REV. 648 (1970).
For cases which held that the privilege may be violated by compelled mental
examination, see French v. District Court, 153 Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268 (1963) ; People
v. English, 31 111. 2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964) ; State v. Olson, 274 Minn. 225, 143
N.W.2d 69 (1966); Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 307 (1944).
Contra, State v. Petty, 32 Nev. 384, 108 P. 934 (1910); Jessner v. State, 202 Wis.
184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930). For a case which held that incriminating statements by
defendants during voluntary mental examinations are admissible, see People v.
Spencer, 60 Cal. 2d 64, 383 P.2d 134, 31 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 1007 (1964).
25. 519 F.2d at 1042-44.
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that since the scope of sections 4244-482o was primarily directed at the
disposition and custody of insane persons charged with, or convicted of,
federal offenses prior to, 27 during, and after commitment, 28 the statute
was in no way intended to provide the Government with a new means of
29
obtaining evidence, damaging to the accused, for use at trial.
The court was presented with a more troublesome issue in considering the defendant's argument that the admission of Dr. Sadoff's testimony violated the attorney-client privilege and infringed upon his sixth
amendment right to counsel, since Dr. Sadoff originally had been retained by defense counsel. 30 In addressing the attorney-client privilege
issue, the court noted the lack of federal case law directly on point.31 It,
therefore, reasoned by analogy to a Second Circuit decision3 2 which had
held that a party's communications to an accountant, pursuant to obtaining
3
legal advice from a lawyer, were protected by the attorney-client privilege.
34
Because of counsel's often critical need for the assistance of experts,
the Third Circuit saw no reason to distinguish a psychiatrist from an
accountant. 5 Thus, in the court's opinion, defendant's communications to
Dr. Sadoff were entitled to the same privilege that his statements to his
36
own attorney possessed.

26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-48 (1970). The scope of the law included persons found
to be incompetent before trial, id. § 4244, persons whose incompetence was undisclosed
at trial but discovered after trial, id. § 4245, and persons who became insane in prison,
though they were competent at trial, id. §§ 4247-48.
27. Id. §§ 4244, 4246.
28. Id. §§ 4245-48.
29. 519 F.2d at 1043-44. The Senate report which accompanied the bill stated:
"[T]he purpose of [the prohibition of use against the accused at trial of a finding that
he is competent to stand trial] is to give adequate assurance to the accused that his right
to plead insanity will be protected." S. REP. No. 1511, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948).
When advised that United States attorneys "have frequently sought [section]
4244 examinations specifically for the purpose of obtaining evidence on the issue of
criminal responsibility in order to rebut anticipated insanity defenses," the court
opined that such use of section 4244 was entirely inconsistent with that section's
purpose. 519 F.2d at 1044. Apparently, the Criminal Division of the Justice Department also engages in dual-purpose examinations under the purported authority of
section 4244. See id. & n.12.
30. 519 F.2d at 1045.
31. Id.
32. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
33. Id.
34. See generally R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 37 (1954); A.
MORRILL, TRIAL DIPLOMACY 127-28 (1971).
35. 519 F.2d at 1046. The Alvarez court stated:

We see no distinction between the need of defense counsel for expert assistance
in accounting matters and the same need in matters of psychiatry. The effective
assistance of counsel with respect to the preparation of an insanity defense
demands recognition that a defendant be as free to communicate with a psychiatric
expert as with the attorney he is assisting.
Id. For a discussion of evidentiary theories employed to arrive at a similar conclusion, see 16 VAND. L. REv. 419 (1963).

36. 519 F.2d at 1046.
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Having found a privilege, the court rejected any waiver argument
urged by the Government.3 7 Despite the mutual discovery order which
had been made upon defense counsel's motion and which had provided
for an exchange between the parties of the reports of any physical or
mental examination, 8 the court found that defense counsel could still
properly expect that expert testimony could not be compelled.3 9
The court also rejected the Government's broader argument that the
mere assertion of an insanity defense waives any attorney-client privilege
with respect to any psychiatric examination of the defendant.4 0 The
court's reasoning was based upon the sixth amendment right to assistance
of counsel. 41 Because the rule advocated by the Government would, in
the court's opinion, inhibit the attorney from obtaining the aid of experts
for fear of their potential appearance as involuntary prosecution witnesses, 42
the court concluded that such a rule would deprive the defendant who
43
pleaded insanity of the effective assistance of counsel.
Although Alvarez's construction of a section 4244 order is much
stricter than that of other circuits, 44 which have reasoned that section 4244's
legislative history was not intended to nullify the court's traditional and
inherent power to order a dual-purpose examination, 45 the construction
adopted in Alvarez was justified for several reasons. First, neither the
legislative history nor the language of section 4244 attempts to deal with
or even recognizes a traditional power of the court to order a dual-purpose
examination. 46 Rather, as the Alvarez court pointed out, the scope of
37. Id. at 1046-47.
38. Id. at 1045. The court answered the Government's argument without
deciding, id. at 1046, whether the order met the waiver requirements set forth in
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), where the Supreme Court of the United
States asserted that a "waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment of a known
right or privilege." Id. at 464.
39. 519 F.2d at 1046. Of the order, the court stated: "[Wle view it as a matter of
convenience in trial preparation which enabled the government to prepare for crossexamination if the defendant decided to call any particular psychiatrist as a witness." Id.
40. Id. at 1046-47. The Government made two further contentions. First, it
argued that the revelation of any factual statements made by Martinez to Dr. Sadoff
would be harmless in a bifurcated trial such as the instant one. Id. The court rejected
that argument, stating:
But the broad waiver rule which it urges would be equally applicable to cases in
which there was no bifurcation. Moreover, the inhibiting effect of a rule waiving
the attorney-client privilege with respect to psychiatric consultations in all cases
of an insanity defense operates not only with respect to the facts of the crime
but also with respect to the defendant's mental state.
Id. at 1047.
Secondly, and more particularly, the Government contended that if the court
erred in admitting Sadoff's testimony, the error was harmless. Id. However, since
Dr. Sadoff reached a conclusion opposite to the one reached by the defense psychiatrist,
Dr. Trent, the court ruled that the error was not harmless. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See cases cited in note 12 supra.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Julian, 469 F.2d 371, 376 (10th Cir. 1972).
46. 519 F.2d 1042-44. For the legislative history of section 4244, see S. REP. No.
209, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1949) ; S. REP. No. 1511, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948).
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section 4244 is limited to the care and custody of the insane prior to
trial and it does not deal with the trial process. 47 Thus, Alvarez' reasoning,
that a psychiatrist cannot testify at trial concerning observations made
during the section 4244 competency examination since that examination
was intended to have no effect after the section 4244 hearing,48 appears
to be consonant with the statute's purpose.
An additional justification for this portion of the court's decision is
found in the substantive criminal law. Sanity, as part of the requisite
mens rea, is an inherent element of culpability 49 and the prosecution, there50
fore, has the burden of proving its presence beyond a reasonable doubt.
It follows then, that the prohibition in section 4244 against the use at
trial of evidence obtained in the examination 5' must apply not only to
the accused's admissions of participation in the crime, but also to any
statements made during the course of the compelled examination, and to
the psychiatrist's opinions concerning the accused's sanity which are
formed as a result of such examination.
With regard to the attorney-client privilege and the sixth amendment
issue there is no rationale in holding communications privileged as to
counsel and not as to experts, since the preparation of an adequate defense
requires that the defendant feel free to communicate with experts employed by defense counsel; and it could not conceivably be argued that the
defendant who pleads insanity intentionally waives the attorney-client
privilege with respect to this attorney. Furthermore, as the court concluded, it does not seem probable that the negotiated mutual discovery
order was ever intended to waive any privilege in light of the parties'
intentions at the time of the agreement.5 2 Since the Government initially
opposed the defendant's discovery motion and it was only after negotiation
that a compromise was reached, 53 it is highly unlikely that the defense
gratuitously bargained away an important privilege or that the Government only reluctantly accepted such an expansive offer.
Similarly, the broader contention of the Government, that the pleading of insanity itself constitutes a waiver of privilege with respect to
the examining psychiatrist, 54 could not stand. The inhibitive effect of
the Government's position would obstruct defense initiative to retain expert
testimony in preparation of the insanity defense, thereby depriving the
defendant of the effective assistance of counsel.5 5 A different evidentiary
47. 519 F.2d 1042-44.
48. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
49. Virgin Islands v. Bellott, 495 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1974) ; see note 24 supra.
50. Virgin Islands v. Bellott, 495 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir. 1974).
51. For the text of section 4244, see note 2 supra.
52. 519 F.2d at 1046.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1046-47; see text accompanying note 40 supra.
55. Conceivably, an attorney would refuse, or at least hesitate, to employ
psychiatric experts, or those experts would be so inhibited in forming their opinions
and writing their reports, for fear that they would be compelled to relate in court the
defendant's admissions of participation in the crime, that their service would be
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question would have been presented if the psychiatric expert, treating
physician, or trial consultant testified at trial for the defendant, 56 for under
the law of evidence the privilege would then clearly be waived and the
Government would then be free to cross-examine.5 7 This, however, was
not the case in Alvarez.
Although the court had no occasion under the facts of Alvarez to
rule upon the propriety of a dual-purpose examination, 8 the decision will
serve to limit the scope of section 4244 hearings to determinations of a
defendant's competency to stand trial, thereby prohibiting the direct use of
section 4244 to provide for examinations into the defendant's sanity at the
time of the offense. The correct procedure for ordering a dual-purpose
examination, or whether a court even has the ability to do so under the
inherent power theory is unresolved. While the Third Circuit offered no
opinion on the inherent power argument, it opined in dicta 59 that such
a dual-purpose examination, whatever the source, might violate the fifth
amendment right against self incrimination. This dicta, however, strongly
indicates that should the issue arise in the future, the Third Circuit will
hold that there is no inherent judicial power to order psychiatric examinations into the accused's sanity. If so, Government access to evidence in
cases involving an insanity defense will accordingly be constricted. Unable
60
to compel psychiatric examination of the defendant via their own experts,
and prohibited from procuring by subpoena the adverse testimony of experts hired by the defense counsel, 61 the Government's ability to meet its
burden of proof would be considerably impaired.6 2 Should the Third Circuit accept this position, the Government would be limited to crossexamination of defendant's experts, the less impressive testimony of lay
witnesses, 63 and to offering its own testimony based only upon hypothetical
facts. 64 It would seem that the lattermost type of testimony would not be
rendered gingerly and, no doubt, in many cases inadequately. See City & County of
San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 236-38, 231 P.2d 26, 30-31 (1951).
56. 519 F.2d at 1046. The court carefully distinguished this situation from
Alvarez. Id.
57. See WIGATORE, supra note 16, § 2390, at 861-65. See Johnson v. United States,
270 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1959); Tweith v. Duluth, 66 F. Supp. 427 (D. Minn. 1946).
The Federal Rules of Evidence have adopted the common law as interpreted by
courts of the United States with respect to privilege except, in civil cases, in regard
to "elements of a claim or defense to which State law supplies the rule of decision"
where privilege is then determined by the law of the State. FED. R. EVID. 501.
58. See note 24 supra.
59. 519 F.2d at 1041-42.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1045-47.
62. See note 24 supra.
63. For a discussion of this subject, see Note, supra note 24, at 670-71.
64. In lieu of having their own experts personally examine defendant, the Government may call their own psychiatric experts to testify as to their opinions on a certain
set of hypothetical facts. Any facts that are included in the hypothetical which form
the basis of the expert's opinion must at some point during the trial be entered into
evidence. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 672, at 792-95; id. § 676, at 797-98.
The uphill struggle of the Government may be mitigated in some cases by
the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule. 16(b) (1) (B)
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accorded much weight by the jury, since the psychiatrist would not actually
have examined the defendant.
Alvarez' ruling upon the attorney-client privilege issue will have a
greater substantive impact than the court's holding with regard to the
section 4244 issue because it is one of the few federal court decisions which
has directly faced this question. Its resolution of the matter effectively
safeguards a defendant's confidential communications with a psychiatrist
hired by his or her attorney, and seemingly communications with any other
expert whose services aid the defense. Alvarez' extention of the privilege,
together with its very important dicta, foreshadows a possible upheaval in
criminal trials involving an insanity defense, whose common theme has
always been the maintenance of a fair state-individual balance in the litigation process. 65 As it has been aptly stated,
It would violate judicial common sense to permit a defendant to
invoke the defense of insanity and foreclose the Government from the
benefit of a mental examination to meet this issue. 66
Michael A. Wolf

allows for Government discovery of reports of physical or mental examinations and of
scientific tests which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence-in-chief at the
trial or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the
trial when the reports relate to his or her testimony, but only upon the condition that
defendant first request either similar reports within the control of the Government
or other documents and tangible objects in their possession or custody. In other words,
discovery is reciprocal, not independent. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
65. For cases where it has been argued that such fairness justifies the inherent
power of a court to order psychiatric examination into the accused's sanity at the time
of the offense, see United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724-25 (4th Cir. 1968) ;
Alexander v. United States, 380 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Pope v. United States,
372 F.2d 710, 720-21 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971).
The imbalance would seem to be exacerbated by the decision in Virgin Islands
v. Bellott, 495 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1974), wherein the Third Circuit held that "the
court must determine whether there is some evidence, either in the government's or
in the defendant's case, that [defendant's] act was a consequence of mental illness"
and, upon the finding of such evidence, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense.
Id. at 1397 (emphasis added).
66. Alexander v. United States, 380 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1967).
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